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The System Dynamics methodology is used in this article as unifying ap-
proach in order to show how a number of theories about the performance
of territories developed in the past 20 years can integrate the one with the
other; to demonstrate this, a model of local economy coherent with these
schools is constructed and simulated.
According to these theories, the ability to produce and use knowledge is at
the centre of regional competitiveness in the advanced world; the model and
the paper illustrate the elements of the local economic system and how they
have to work coherently towards the continuous process of innovation, needed
to be successful.
The model also shows in a new framework how, due to the cumulative nature
of this innovation process, it is possible to obtain equilibria with regional in-
come diﬀerentiation, even in the presence of identical territories. When this
is the case, structural policies, aiming to allow lagging regions to better in-
novate and/or imitate external knowledge, are appropriate.
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During the 80s and 90s there has been a resurgence (Storper, 1995) of interest
for issues related to space, which gained new importance. This new attention
can be re-conducted to four observations: ﬁrst there is the evidence that the
Fordist method of production has not eliminated the possibility for diﬀerent
types of production spaces to prosper. In particular there are aggregates of
small and medium enterprises (SMEs) that draw from the features of their
localities to be competitive in the global markets. A second observation con-
cerns multinationals, which are often re-locating the production processes
but at the same time usually keeping the highest-level phases of production
and invention in speciﬁc areas of the most advanced countries. Then, there
is the agglomeration of activities of many sectors in speciﬁc places. Finally,
there is the convergence debate in its regional aspect: when regressions evi-
dence a conditional convergence rate of around 2% a year (as in Barro and
Sala-i-Martin, 1991 and a large number of followers) we still perceive the
world as patchwork of richer and poorer places, between nations but also
within, with no plausible conjecture for an extensive levelling in the next
future.
In mainstream economics, the observation of uneven development lev-
els and the re-discovery of the Marshallian external economies led to the
birth of a now well established group of theories known with the name of
New Economic Geography (Ottaviano and Puga, 1998, Fujita, Krugman and
Venables, 1999, Fujita and Thisse, 2002, Baldwin et al. 2003); in the con-
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1tributions belonging to N.E.G., various mechanisms, often but not always
using the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) monopolistic competition framework, drive to
the possibility of multiple equilibria for the location of economic activities in
space.
Besides the more orthodox economics, a number of theories, which we will
jointly hereafter indicate, for the sake of simplicity, as ’heterodox’, grew with
the purpose of explaining why some local systems are more eﬀective than
others; the use of the term heterodox is here justiﬁed by the fact that these
contributions are resting more on case studies and descriptive models than
on analytical derivations and mathematical models, and are usually more
interested in the dynamics of adjustment than on the eventual equilibrium
outcomes. In this article, even if we use a number of concepts which are
shared by orthodox economics and draw conclusions which are compatible
with it, we rely on the developments of a number of ’heterodox’ theories,
which are brieﬂy outlined in section 2.
This paper uses the System Dynamics as an unifying approach for all
these heterodox schools of thought and in this way makes more evident their
complementarity. The choice of this methodology is due to the possibility to
represent loops and feedbacks, things which are hard to deal with traditional
economic modelling tools; this feature, when dealing with heterodox theories,
is so valuable that it more than compensates the disadvantage of the lack of
maximization in a minor number of behaviors. With the System Dynamics a
complex representation of a local economic system can be drawn as illustrated
in section 3 and a simulation model consistent with the representation then
built and simulated.
This eﬀort is similar to the one of the French Regulation theorists when
they tried to describe a ”mode de r´ egulation” (Boyer, 1986, 1998a); in this
case the model aims at identifying and describing the mechanics the local eco-
nomic system in a case in which technological spillovers are very high within
a territory and the competition between regions is based on innovation.
The model built encompasses most of the features of the ’heterodox’ theo-
ries without encountering any contradiction among them but, instead, being
supported by issues of more than one theory in each block, therefore corrob-
orating the argument of complementarity (Cooke et al., 1998).
In addition to this, this article shows how the outcome of diﬀerent levels
of development among similar territories, is also possible in an heterodox
framework. In fact, when dynamic increasing returns (see section 5) are
allowed, and in particular when competition is based on technology, the
competitive advantage tend to reproduce itself and multiple equilibria exist
so that the regions persist at diﬀerent levels of competitiveness and welfare.
Finally, with the introduction of stochastic behaviors, this approach is
2able to represent the stickiness of the development rankings without assuming
any deterministic outcome.
Summary
A simulation model of a local production system, compatible with all the
theories of section 2, is built with the System Dynamics approach (section 3)
as extensively explained in section 4. The focus is on the capability (or non
capability) of the system to engender the right virtuous circles, which allow
it to continuously innovate and, in this way, to be competitive.
Examples of simulations are in section 5; these show, on the one side,
the ample possibility of the model to implement and simulate the eﬀects of
a large number of regional policies and, on the other side, they reveal the
advantage of structural policies on transfers of resources when the purpose
is to generate long lasting development.
Section 6 demonstrates that, also with a model based on a heterodox
framework, it is possible to get diﬀerent levels of development in identical
production spaces, something which is usual, but in the more orthodox new
economic geography approach: a number of models identical to the one of
section 4 may be appended the one besides the other and linked through
technology. It is in this way illustrated that diﬀerent but structurally equal
regional systems may persist at diﬀerent relative technological levels; conse-
quently they are diﬀerently competitive and, therefore, at diﬀerent welfare
levels. All this is due to the cumulative nature of knowledge (Fratesi, 2003).
This outcome is more similar to what we observe in the advanced world than
agglomeration through the movement of people or ﬁrms.
Sections 7 and 8 concludes with the achievements and the limits of the
model and the policy recommendation that can be drawn from this exercise.
2 The heterodox schools
Among the ﬁrst to re-discover the study of the localized processes of pro-
duction, the industrial districts school, which completely revisited the Mar-
shallian contribution and applied it to the Italian case, where, beyond the
duality between the richer and based on the large ﬁrm North West and the
lagging South, the regions of North East and Centre (NEC) had developed
a dynamic economic model made of specialized districts of SMEs able to
compete worldwide. These districts were characterized by (Becattini, 1990)
the presence in the same area of a community of people and a community of
ﬁrms, the one and the other strictly linked because of the share of common
3values and a number of informal economic links.
Since the ability to compete of many districts, is not only based on this
ﬂexible system of production, but also on the capability to innovate and to
share knowledge in the area, the research project on Innovative Milieux was
born in the 80’s with Philippe Aydalot. In the deﬁnition of Camagni (1991,
p.3) the Innovative Milieu is ”the set, or the complex network of mainly
social relationship on a limited geographical area, often determining a spe-
ciﬁc external ’image’ and a speciﬁc internal ’representation’ and a sense of
belonging, which enhance the local innovative capability through synergetic
and collective learning processes”. The concept has evident similarities with
the industrial district one, but there is a diﬀerent focus of innovation: in fact
the milieu is able to guarantee a continuous process of innovation diﬀused
among the ﬁrms of the milieu itself, so that it is dynamically eﬃcient and
not only statically.
The space, in the milieu, is active and the learning process is outside the sin-
gle ﬁrm but inside the milieu, this owing to a spontaneous collective learning
process due to the mobility of the workforce inside the milieu, to the coop-
eration of ﬁrms that allows them the transfer of tacit knowledge, to the fact
that risks are taken collectively, reducing the dynamic risk for the individual
and therefore allowing more propensity to innovate.
Without any connection with the above theories but with a focus on the
economics of innovation, the book of Nelson and Winter ”An Evolution-
ary Theory of Economic Change” (1982) gave birth to the theories called
’evolutionary’. In the words of Dosi and Nelson (1993, p.3) ”The term ’Evo-
lutionary’ ought to be reserved for theories about dynamic time paths, that
is ones which aim to explain how things change over time, or to explain why
things are what they are in a manner that places weight on ’how they got
there’”. The concepts of technological paradigm, technological trajectory
and technological regimes are helpful in explaining the processes and some
”unexpected” outcomes as the lock-in. In the ’90s a number of publications
(Lundvall, 1992, Nelson, 1993, Edquist, 1997), not always explicitly evolu-
tionary, extended the analysis to the ”Systems of Innovations” that is to ”all
parts and aspects of the economic structure and institutional set up aﬀecting
learning as well as searching and exploring” (Lundvall, 1992, p.12, ’broad
deﬁnition’). These investigations rapidly extended from the national to sub-
national contexts and are generally considered fully compatible with the new
regional science (Cooke, Uranga and Extebarria, 1998) when intending to
explain why diﬀerent levels of regional development co-exist.
The 80’s witnesses a renewed attention to the regional economies also
outside Europe. In particular, from the observation of the Silicon Valley, a
theory was born in California, thanks to the works of a number of authors;
4among these Storper (1995) extended the analysis from the traded to the
untraded interdependencies, that is from the observation of intense transac-
tions between ﬁrms in the same space (with a mobile local workforce so that
the increased ﬂexibility allows a reduction of costs) to the observation of un-
traded relations, often conventional, neither ﬁxed nor present in all times and
all places but able, when present and positive, to enhance collective action
and learning and, in this way, make the system more eﬃcient.
The inﬂuence of institutions, rules and routines on competitiveness has
been emphasised by many authors (e.g. Cooke and Morgan, 1998) in contri-
butions that we could call ”neo-institutionalist” and which are applied with
success to a large number of cases of local production systems.
Finally, some authors focused on the mechanisms of diﬀusion of knowledge
and of learning within and among territories, instead than with respect to
organizations or people. The term ”learning region” (Florida, 1995) has even
been introduced to deﬁne these mechanisms.
3 The System Dynamics approach
The System Dynamics was born in the late 50s and early 60s, with Forrester,
who published in 1961 his book ”Industrial Dynamics”. Then, the founder
and other followers have improved the methodology and applied it in a large
number of ﬁelds, from economics to society, to the environment; this last as-
pect was especially developed in the 70s with Dana Meadows and the ”Club
of Rome”. Today the System Dynamics has a Society, a review (the System
Dynamics Review), an annual world research conference and is mainly ap-
plied to business policy and strategy problems (Sterman, 2000), even if it is
not rare to ﬁnd contributions in other ﬁelds as economics (Smith and van
Ackere, 2002).
The system dynamics approach has been synthesized by Wolstenholme
(1990) as ”observing and identifying problematic behavior of a system over
time and creating a valid diagrammatic representation (or model) of the
system capable of reproducing (by computer simulation) the existing system
behaviour and of facilitating the design of improved system behaviour”. The
most interesting feature for the purpose of studying the mechanics of a local
production system is the complexity allowed by this simulative approach, in
particular the possibility to represent loops and feedbacks.
We chose to use the SD, instead of other simulative approaches, because
it allows to separate two diﬀerent phases of the modelling process: the ﬁrst
one is the design of the structure of the model according to the relationships
which are considered most important by the modeller. The second one is
5the formalization of the equations according to the relationships that are
speciﬁed in the ﬁrst phase. This two step mechanism becomes very useful
when the problems to be analyzed are very complex, as is the case of the
mechanics of a local production system.
To go into further detail, the ﬁrst step of the modelling process begins
with the detection of which variables are the stocks; the stocks represent the
inertia of the system and are persistent in time, i.e. maintain their value
after each run of the simulation, apart from the modiﬁcations induced by
the ﬂows. There exist mono and bi-directional ﬂows, depending on their
value. Positive ﬂows are called inﬂows, negative ﬂows outﬂows, but it is also
possible to have bi-directional ﬂows. Since the whole model is a system of
diﬀerence equations, stocks and ﬂows are linked in this way:
stockt+1 = stockt + ¯stockt + °
The ﬂow is therefore the part of equation which changes the value of the
stock in time (¯stockt + °) and, when it always has the same sign, either
is an inﬂow or an outﬂow, depending on the sign. In order to simplify the
study of causal relationships, often the positive and negative component of
the ﬂows are represented separately with an inﬂow and an outﬂow. In the
diagrams of the various system dynamics simulation softwares existing, the
stocks are represented with boxes and the ﬂows with thick arrows, sometimes
featuring a sort of hydraulic tap.
All the rest of the variables are re-calculated at each run of simulation
and then enter inside ¯ and ° as appropriate and can either be parameters
or functions of other variables, parameters stocks or ﬂows. It must be re-
membered, however, that the only type of variables to have ’memory’ are the
stocks; this issue will be of paramount importance when, in section 4.6 we
will deal with the resilience of the system. All the variables which are neither
stocks nor ﬂows are usually represented with circles. The thin arrows, in the
diagrams, are used to indicate that a variable is used in the calculation of
another. Finally, if a variable appears in the diagram as a number of boxes
or of circles overlapping, it is to indicate a vectorial variable.
The second step is to enter the actual equations, which it is possible
to do only according to the diagram previously designed, choosing the best
mathematical form for each equation. In this phase, other parameters can
be added and entered as simple numbers, but these parameters can never
change in time and cannot be tracked in the study of the dynamics.




Figure 1: Two virtuous circles at the base of regional competitiveness.
4 Characteristics of the model
When writing the model, a number of general features were used through-
out. Not all the possible relevant endogenous variables were included; this
ﬁrst because the focus is on the development of the two virtuous circles in
which we will go more deeply below, and then to avoid the ”verisimilitude
trap” (Gilbert and Doran, 1994) that consists in adding too many details
not because needed but simply because plausible. Because parsimony is a
quality in a model, the number of exogenous variables has been limited too:
the addition of parameters has decreasing returns in terms of realism, and, if
if the model expands too much, it becomes too complicated and impossible
to read.
However, the methodology of the System Dynamics allows to give the
model the precious characteristic of the interrelation: each sector is linked
with all the others (see Fig. 2), and this is important since the analysis of a
territorial production and innovation system has to be holistic.
When entering the equations, we followed a few general procedures: ﬁrst,
most stock nodes have a dissipative mechanism, justiﬁed by the existence of
deterioration and obsolescence, or by the normal turnover (through births
and retirements) of the population; the Environment is the only node that
instead has a conservative mechanism which is justiﬁed by the possibility
of nature to regenerate itself, even if in the long run. The local technology
node is not dissipative, but must confront itself with a continually growing
external technology; for this reason it also needs to receive inﬂows at any
period, to maintain competitiveness.
Throughout the model, the single equations have decreasing returns to
scale, as it is more plausible to be in the real world, but the interaction of all
7equations give rise to dynamic increasing returns to scale so that the model
has a central unstable equilibrium, in which it was calibrated and with all
possible nodes equal to 1, and two stable, one upper and one lower, equilibria.
This issue will be further developed in section 5.
Whenever possible the equations are in multiplicative form so that the
elasticity of a variable with respect to another can be easily set up. Once
decided that the returns are statically decreasing and dynamically increasing,
the choice of the actual value is not relevant for a theoretical exercise. In fact,
the elasticity parameters can be signiﬁcantly changed without qualitatively
altering the functioning of the model; moreover, the elasticities actually used
in the simulations are deliberately intermediate, so that, even if it is possible
for many researchers to disagree on them, it is not possible to collect general
consensus on the direction of the possible modiﬁcation.
4.1 Theoretical focus of the model
The competitiveness of a region, in the model as in the theories of reference,
is the result of the good working of two virtuous mechanisms: ﬁrst (Fig. 1-
A) there is the more traditional circle of the accumulation of local resources
(infrastructure, services, etc.), these have positive eﬀect on competitiveness,
and in this way a larger monetary output can be produced and part of this
reinvested into the accumulation of local resources. The second circle (Fig. 1-
B) is less traditional and is the one of innovation: by innovating, the system is
able to continuously generate technology and in this way remains competitive
in the markets (Porter, 1998); competitiveness generates value added which
can be reinvested in learning and R&D, and hence allows to continue the
innovative process.
To make the model able to cope with the 2 virtuous circles, it is made
of four main blocks, corresponding to the 4 main components of a local
production system (plus an additional block for the ﬁnal indicator and control
variables, Fig. 2): (1) the local government, which drains resources from the
territory and can use these to provide infrastructure and services necessary
to make the territory competitive. (2) The ﬁrms, the agent which, according
to the heterodox theories are agents belonging to the territory instead of
seeking the best location; they produce value added by using the inputs
available, moreover they can reinvest part of the proﬁts in innovation and
human capital, and create networks; (3) The workers, also strictly linked to
their territory; these are very important because the learning mechanisms are
embedded in the people living in the places. (4) The innovation dynamics,
comprising both the creation of new technology or the imitation and diﬀusion



























































































































Figure 2: The four building blocks of the model.
to the advanced world. Each sector will in turn be illustrated in the following
pages.
This schema has its predecessors in the work of Freeman (1987) who, in its
analysis of Japan, indicated in the central government (since its analysis was
at the state level), in the education system and of professional qualiﬁcation,
in the R&D strategies and in the relationships among ﬁrms and between
these and the central government the key sectors to investigate.
More recently Bramanti (1999) designated as the four focal points of the
emerging paradigm of the relational development and of territorial competi-
tion the innovative processes, the network relations, the learning mechanisms
and the governance mechanisms.
4.2 Learning and human capital
The learning mechanisms are represented in two of the sectors of the model.
As it is in the literature, which distinguishes between information and knowl-
edge, with the ﬁrst belonging to all which can be blueprinted and the second
that, together with active understanding ”[...] resides in the heads of individ-
uals” (Simmie, 1997, p.7). The modelling of information is in the Innovation
block, whereas knowledge is in the Learning one, which, with the use of a
population dynamics, embodies the fact that ”in each technology there are
elements which cannot be written down in blueprint form or are diﬃcult to
verbalize and can therefore not be diﬀused easily” (Carlsson and Jacobson
1997).
Tacit knowledge (basically but not only know-how), is incorporated in
the people, for this reason the learning and human capital sector is the one
9with the largest inertia.
In traditional economic growth models in the wave of Solow (1956) and
also in more recent endogenous growth models (Lucas, 1988) labour is ba-
sically treated as a production factor, not diﬀerently from capital; its pro-
ductivity is consequently determined by the technology and the amount of
capital per head. In these analysis economic growth is also determined by
the growth of population. On the contrary, in modern economies, the de-
mographic pulse has arrested and global competition is not only on the cost
of production factors but on that complex set of factors that stimulate and
generate permanently the innovation (Maillat and Kebir, 1998).
In the model, therefore, there are three stocks of workers. The unskilled,
workers without any particular ability who in the model constitute a residual
class and are not a factor of competitiveness. The skilled, workers that,
holding or not a formal qualiﬁcation, have the skills needed for the job they
are doing. The presence of a larger quota of skilled workers in the system has
its positive eﬀects on the costs of the ﬁrms (Wiig e Wood, 1997), but also
on the easiness of imitation of external technologies. Beyond the assumption
of no growth of population, there is the further assumption that both these
groups of workers are not mobile outside the local system. This ﬁts very
well the European case where workers are rarely mobile internationally, nor
inter-regionally.
Finally, there is a separate stock of workers, these mobile not only nation-
ally but also internationally: the R&D personnel, called as in the Research
and Development Annual Statistics of Eurostat. These constitute usually
less than 2% of the total population and are not only mobile but also usually
concentrated in the capital cities areas or in speciﬁc advanced regions. The
factors that are assumed to aﬀect the location of these are not only the level
of instruction infrastructure in the region, but also the level of Research and
University, the speciﬁc investments done by the ﬁrms to attract them and
also the level of amenities in the territory, to which they also appear to be
sensitive. The R&D personnel has an own retirement system and is modelled
apart of the two other stocks of workers which, on the contrary, are strictly
linked.
In fact the total number of skilled and unskilled workers is ﬁxed and
normalized to 1, with a retirement mechanism that in each period substitute
workers with new entrants, whose skilled % is determined by the level of
instruction in the system. During their working age the skilled workers can
become inapt to their duties because they do not automatically follow the
evolution of the modes of production and therefore become unskilled; this
obsolescence mechanism can be contrasted by a training mechanism, which
is either public, through instruction, or ﬁnanced by the ﬁrms. All these
10mechanisms are represented in the model by appropriate ﬂows.
4.3 Innovation
The dynamics of explicit knowledge is drawn in the Innovation block. This
is the real engine of growth and competitiveness of all the system, where
internal factors and interactions with the external environment determine
the positioning of the region with respect to the technological frontier.
The importance of innovation for growth was known long ago, but before
the 80s its mechanics was still rarely made explicit and seen rather as a
”black box” (Aghion and Tirole, 1998) of which both the inputs and the
outputs were known but not the inside functioning. The part of growth not
explained by the accumulation of physical or human capital and therefore
due to technological progress, constituted the so-called ”residual” (Solow,
1957).
With the re-discovery of Shumpeter, the evolutionary theories and the
focus on innovation in endogenous growth theory, starting with the Romer
(1990) model, the innovative process has become central to any economic
growth investigation. Moreover in most heterodox theories, as rapidly men-
tioned in the introduction, innovation is a local (in a national or regional
regional scale) process. For this reason, in the model, coherently with the
heterodox theories outlined in the introduction, technological knowledge is
shared among all the actors of the territorial system, and the innovative pro-
cess is the outcome of a collective eﬀort of which all ﬁrms can beneﬁt. This
ﬁts very well to the ’innovative milieu’ case, where knowledge is in large part
shared, but also ﬁts the learning regions and all these cases of local systems
of production (that are prevailing today in the developed world) in which
technology is vital for competitiveness and the level of overall technology is
at the basis of the performance of the system taken as a whole.
The deﬁnition of innovation used in this block is that of Edquist and
Johnson (1997, p.42) according to whom ”technological innovations are [...]
regarded as the introduction into the economy of new knowledge or new com-
binations of existing knowledge” is best suitable. There is a large agreement
(Teece, 1998) on the following characteristics of innovation, which were taken
into account in the modelling process: uncertainty, so that the modelling has
to involve stochastic variables; path dependency, due to the diﬃculty of es-
caping from technological trajectories; cumulative nature, because most of
what is found is built on what already existed and moreover draws on tacit
knowledge; irreversibility, not only because of the large investments that new
technologies often need, but also because of market failure as the lock-in that
makes diﬃcult to change a standard with a superior one once it is widely
11diﬀused; the presence of interrelation between sub-systems, with other users
and developers, necessary for the success of an innovation; a large degree of
tacitness, i.e. knowledge impossible to codify and therefore diﬃcult to trans-
mit; a certain degree of appropriability, which has inﬂuence on the propen-
sity of the economic agents to invest in innovation so that there is often a
trade-oﬀ between static eﬃciency, which would claim for as less as possible
appropriability to increase welfare and dynamic eﬃciency, which is due to
the stimulus to innovate coming from the possibility to retain the proﬁts.
What role for the territory in such process? In the words of Porter and
Solvell (1998, p.446), it is ”central to the question of how easily knowledge
embedded in one local cluster can be imitated by outside actors. If diﬀusion
is indeed rapid and can be accomplished at low cost, globalization forces
would override earlier locally conﬁned innovation. If, on the other hand,
diﬀusion eﬀect is sluggish, costly and involves long lead times, then localized
innovation processes will remain essential”. The model allows both cases to
be simulated, since it is endowed with a intentional local innovation, a costly
imitation and a free diﬀusion mechanisms, whose parameters can be adjusted
according to the opinions of the user.
The case that is more interesting, however, is the one of sluggish dif-
fusion that allows for the space an extended role in which (Bramanti and
Maggioni, 1997) there is co-ordination of industrial decisions, the political
choices on localization, creation and repartition of resources are taken, there
is the formation and evolution of un-traded interdependencies and actors
learn technologically and organisationally, technology and innovation are cre-
ated generating a process of collective building of resources.
In building the model, the suggestions of Nelson and Rosenberg (1998)
were followed wherever possible: ﬁrst they suggest to consider technological
investment in large part as product of investment intentionally decided and
directed toward it; second, parsimony does not allow to exclude a role for
public and not proprietary research as that in universities and public R&D
institutions; third unavoidable point is the inclusion of uncertainty, diﬀerent
from risk because it is not calculable in advance. In addition to these features,
innovation has been considered, for the reasons explained before, a process
radically embedded into the territory.
To encompass all these issues the innovation block is built on the inter-
action of two stocks of knowledge (called local and world technology) with
the inﬂuence of the stock of R&D institutions in the territory.
The mechanism best suitable to the evolution of world technology is an
exponential one, in which at each simulation period the stock of world knowl-
edge grows of a percentage p, so that the cumulative nature is taken into
account. The parameter can be kept ﬁxed in the simulations for simplicity
12reasons but is assumed to be stochastic so that technology can be submitted
to unpredictable cycles and shocks. The local stock of knowledge also grows
at each simulation period, but under the composite eﬀect of three forces: a
spontaneous and not costly diﬀusion and a costly imitation make external
knowledge also available inside the territory; the third is the local capability
to innovate that is built cumulatively on the local stock of knowledge again
with a stochastic exponential parameter, but now this parameter depends
on the endowments of the system itself. The confront of local and world
knowledge then creates an index of ”technology gap” which is at the ba-
sis of the competitiveness of the local system, since our focus is on relative
competitiveness.
A number of exogenous parameters and endogenous stocks inﬂuence the
three mechanisms: diﬀusion is inﬂuenced by the openness of the system and
the presence of a skilled workforce; imitation by the previous two plus the
spending of ﬁrms (in particular those of the ring sector that don’t spend
on own innovation); innovation is determined by the stock of Research and
University institutions of the system, with this stock being aﬀected by ob-
solescence as all infrastructure but more rapid and with input coming from
public spending, ﬁrm investment and R&D personnel presence.
When the local system approaches the technological frontier, an increas-
ing part of the knowledge produced locally can be thought to be completely
new worldwide, so that its eﬀect is to increase the stock of world knowledge as
long as the local one. This mechanism adds realism and avoids the explosion
of the system, but is also the reason because the model is suitable to explain
relative growth (competitiveness) instead than absolute one. Moreover, this
feature is helpful in a multi-regional framework as the one of section 6.
The model was calibrated in an equilibrium in which the summed eﬀect
of the three inﬂows of local knowledge produces locally the growth rate of
the world knowledge: both stocks grow exponentially but the gap remains
stable; in simulations, the system has the possibility to start virtuous circles
and reduce the technological gap but also to start vicious circles and lose
ground; this will be more extensively discussed in section 5.
4.4 Market and enterprises (networking)
At the core of any local production system there is a web of ﬁrms which
represent a key factor for the development of the territory; if this web is
not dynamic and diﬀused enough, the lack of entrepreneurship can be a
constraint on local development that is hard to overcome, even with the
most appropriate policy.
The block of the model which includes the market, the ﬁrms and their
13relations is called Networking. The assumption of the model, coherent with
the reference theories, is that production is a local process for which the
ﬁrms use extensively immaterial resources (like knowledge and skills) that
are available at sub-national level. Since the model scale is the region, the
market is instead mostly external and the demand for the ﬁrms of the region
is more dependent on national and international factors than on internal,
even if both eﬀects are included in the model.
In the literature there exist many possible classiﬁcations for the ﬁrms
(according to age, size, property, etc.) but the most interesting one, when
dealing with the innovation capabilities of the local production systems of
the advanced economies, is the one between core and ring ﬁrms. The clas-
siﬁcation used here is similar but not coinciding to the one used by Storper
and Harrison (1991) in their taxonomy of the governance mechanisms in the
local production systems, (all core, all ring no core, core-ring with lead ﬁrm,
core ring with coordinating ﬁrm) and also similar to that between ”leader”
and ”indotto” of Folloni and Maggioni (1994). For our purposes we deﬁne
as ”core” the ﬁrms that compete on the markets with their dynamic ability
to propose innovative products; the ﬁrms of the ”ring” are not only the fur-
nishers of the ﬁrst group but, more extensively, all the ﬁrms that renounce
to compete with always new products and locate themselves in the manufac-
ture of more mature products. The behaviour of the two groups of ﬁrms, as
was already previewed when illustrating the innovation block, is diﬀerently
modelled.
An assumption allows to represent the ﬁrms as continuous variables: since
all the establishments of the diﬀerent sectors are in general of diﬀerent size,
the total of the production capability is not made of a number of quantums
of equal size, but can be treated as if it was the ”quantity of ﬁrm” of the local
system; to see it diﬀerently, it could be a proxy for the ”entrepreneurship”
available in the system, once it is assumed that this has a direct relation with
the amount of entrepreneurial initiatives in the region.
The amount of core and ring ﬁrms can change, but not as much as other
variables, and this is realistic because, coherently with the ’heterodox’ theo-
ries, we consider the ﬁrms generated by the people living in the region and,
therefore, it is not plausible that the production capability of a single place
can grow more than a certain amount, with the exception of the productivity
growth due to technological advancements, which is however modelled apart
(section 4.3).
The cost function for the productive plants is also unique for each group;
this does not need to assume that all ﬁrms face the same costs, only that
the overall average eﬀect can be modelled. And the costs of a plant are very
dependent on the endowments of the region of location (Porter, 1994).
14The variables that are thought to have inﬂuence on production costs are
similar for the two groups but not coincident: both have the quantity of
infrastructure per ﬁrm, the quota of the skilled workforce and the technology
gap (with a lower parameter for the ring ﬁrms); the core ﬁrms’ costs are also
inﬂuenced by the presence of R&D personnel and, positively, of ring ﬁrms in
the territory: some of them can be sub-contractors.
Firms are mobile in the model: the net eﬀect of mobility depends on
proﬁts, the openness of the system, the interaction between the two groups
of ﬁrms (so that the core ﬁrms take advantage from the presence of ring
ﬁrms and vice versa) and the congestion/concurrence eﬀects (so that both
the core and the ring ﬁrms are hampered by the excessive number of ﬁrms of
the same type, even if there exist indirect positive eﬀects of co-localization),
and on the reproducibility (a synthetic indicator of the endowments of the
territorial system that will be discussed later on). The net mobility allows a
number of interesting policy experiments as the one of Fig.8, which will be
illustrated in section 5.
The market mechanism, not central in this paper, has for this reason been
chosen as simple as possible: a demand function with constant elasticity of
price, makes the tax rate inﬂuence the proﬁts but not the gross mark-up and
the prices of the ﬁrms. The demand is then aﬀected by a number of variables
and parameters: among the latter an important role is played by the openness
of the system which has negative eﬀect on the ring and reversed U eﬀect for
the core; the technology gap has an important eﬀect (negative for both types
of ﬁrms), since products with more technological content are either more
demanded or less sensible to price than other less advanced (Campisi et al.,
1997); the level of services provided by the public administration is important
and positive because of their role in the model of increasing the capacity to
penetrate the market (Onida et al., 1992); the concurrence between ﬁrms
of the same type has negative eﬀects for both types, but the quantity of
core ﬁrms has indeed a positive eﬀect on the quantities demanded to the
ring (since a part of their supply is provided locally). An exogenous ”market
cycles” variable is added to allow the simulation of external shocks and cycles
which may aﬀect the local system.
The proﬁts of the ﬁrms, calculated as multiplication between the diﬀer-
ence of unitary prices and costs per the amount of ﬁrms, constitute the value
added of the system that is the major output of the networking block. This
value added is in part levied up by the public administration by the mean
of taxes, in part constitute net proﬁts (that are supposed to go to the local
inhabitants and so are a welfare indicator), in part is reinvested by the ﬁrms
in innovation and in human resources in the way that was described when
analyzing the previous blocks.
15The quotas of proﬁts reinvested in each option, as long as the taxes, are
important parameters that can be changed to simulate policies and reactions.
4.5 The role of local government
The fourth block of the model is called government because it includes all
the variables that are controlled by the local government in addition to other
organizational variables that are not relevant to the networking block.
The fundamental role for this block is the allocation of public spending
among the diﬀerent needs of the territory. The local government can get re-
sources from taxes, borrowing and the central government and spends these
resources through the vectorial variable ”expenditure”. According to Cooke,
Uranga and Extebarria (1998) there are three main systems in the creation
and use of public resources locally: the case of decentralized spending, in
which the central government takes the decisions that are afterwards im-
plemented by the local authorities for eﬃciency reasons; the possibility of
autonomous spending, when the local government has the rights to decide
how to allocate the resources which still come from the centre; the presence
of taxation authority, when the local governments can also levy the amount
they chose of taxes. The model can simulate all the three cases, but it is
the third one that is more interesting since it allows to better distinguish the
eﬀects of the local policies and because it is the one supported by most local
authorities today.
There is no absolute best scale for local economic policies, it depends on
the eﬃcient scale for decisions and implementations; however it is important
to remark that the services that are more important for the ﬁrms are those
available locally because of their accessibility.
Lundvall and Johnson (1994) assert that the market mechanisms works
well enough in the allocation of existing knowledge, but that in the learn-
ing economy (as that of this model and of the advanced world now) the
mechanisms of learning and of innovation are also fundamental so that the
intervention of government is necessary according to ﬁve aspects: (a) it can
provide the means of learning, i.e. increase the capability of learn and inno-
vate through investment in education and training; (b) it can give incentives
to learn, with a policy apt to encourage innovation; (c) it can increase the ca-
pability to learn, using policies apt to favor the organizational change inside
the ﬁrms; (d) it can promote the access to the relevant knowledge not only
with high-level academic institutions but stimulating the transfer of knowl-
edge and the co-operation between these and the ﬁrms, especially those in
the high tech; (e) it has also to create the premises that allow the agents to
learn to forget, that is to abandon all these skills that are obsolete. In the
16evolutionary literature, therefore, we observe that support to innovation and
creation of new resources are added to the traditional government task of
optimal allocation (Belussi, 1997).
The government, in this model, performs all these roles: through the
vectorial variable ”expenditure” it provides local services to the ﬁrms, it
invests in education and in R&D, it heals the environment and provides
infrastructure. The last two roles, never mentioned earlier in the paper,
deserve some description.
The model features a stock called Environment, which represents the level
of physical amenities that are present in the system. From the standardized
initial level it deteriorates under the burden of economic activity and of pop-
ulation; it can be improved with public expenditure (we assume for simplicity
that no private agent would do so) and has a mechanism of ”bio-persistence”
that makes nature tend to return to its standard level in the long run.
Infrastructure, the third stock under direct government control, is the
nucleus of the Social Overhead Capital, and its eﬀects on development have
been at the centre of an intense debate following the works of Aschauer
(1988). Here infrastructure is indivisible, non-proprietary and generic, but
not a public good strictu-sensu since the number of ﬁrms that use it mat-
ters and induces congestion. Infrastructure in the model is diﬀerent from
”services” because it needs some time after the investment before becoming
operative (and this is easy to model in a system dynamics framework). In-
frastructure, as all the features of the systems, is subject to wear oﬀ and
obsolescence.
A number of exogenous parameters are included in the sector for simu-
lation purposes, as the level of adequacy of the government (represented as
the amount of expenditure that really goes to its duties), of corruption, of
associationism. Moreover, there is the possibility for the local government to
get extra-resources from the central government and to borrow at a settable
interest rate; these features allow the simulation of a extensive number of
policy experiments.
4.6 A suitable synthetic Indicator
The simple per capita value added, even if very important, appears insuﬃ-
cient by itself as ﬁnal indicator of a complex system as this one. This because
it is static, and in fact you can observe a high level of value added in a period
simply because of a favorable temporary shock when the system overall is
badly working and in this way losing ground with respect to competiting
localities. In addition to this, the role of environment as an indicator of
quality of life can not be neglected; for these two reasons the ﬁnal synthetic
17 
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Figure 3: The outcome on the ﬁnal indicator of 4 diﬀerent policies. Notice
that the outcome of policies (3) and (4) are not directly comparable with the
Pareto criterium and some utility function has to be explicited.
indicator of this model is built ad-hoc to include static as well as dynamic
factors, economic as well as environmental variables
Two of the parts of the synthetic indicator are undebatably the net proﬁts
per capita (that is the part of value added that goes into citizens’ consump-
tion) and the environment level; the third part has to be a dynamic indicator:
this has to represent the ”sustainable advantage” of the system, that is its
ability to produce and reproduce in time the factors of economic performance,
or, to use the words of Florida (1995, p.535), the ability of ”re-creating, main-
taining and sustaining the conditions to be world class performers through
continuous improvement of technology, continuous development of human
resources, the use of clean production technology, elimination of waste, and
a commitment to continuous environmental improvement”.
A solid productive fabric can be an insurance for the future since for
example (McCann, 1995), a place with a solid fabric of infrastructure and
skilled workers, due to the presence of a district of ﬁrms in a sector, can
experience a crisis due to the crisis of the sector; but, after a few years,
the same place could experience fast re-growth of its industrial activity due
to the birth or arrival of ﬁrms in diﬀerent sectors which beneﬁt not of the
externalities they create but of the skills of the workforce that had been
created by the previous activity.
The variable that represents this long term sustainable advantage, has
18to take into account all the factors of the model that will aﬀect its future
performance and that are, at least to a certain extent, persistent over time:
the technology gap, the quota of skilled workers, the quota of R&D personnel,
the amount of infrastructure and of services, the amount of Research and
University, that of instruction, plus the Environment itself, for the role it
has in capturing the mobile R&D personnel. All these are put together in a




Where Fi are the factors and
P
®i = 1
The weights of the factors are empirically calculated by comparing the
rapidity of the system to react to a change of them. The outcome is with
a very good approximation the ”resilience” of the system (Bramanti and
Ratti, 1997) i.e. its capability to confront negative shocks and come back to
virtuous growth paths.
Finally, the three basic components are put together in another multi-
plicative form as the one above to form the ﬁnal indicator, but this time the
exponents weights, still summing 1, are completely arbitrary: in fact they
depend on the preferences, the aversion to risk and the temporal horizon of
the decisor, hence on a political decision.
A ﬁrst interesting conclusion that can be drawn from the model is, there-
fore, that no policy is the best in all cases. In fact, when running the sim-
ulations, diﬀerent weights in the ﬁnal indicator give diﬀerent classiﬁcations
of the group of policies that are compared. The advisor to the government
should always try to reveal the preferences of the decision body, and then
design the policy that is optimally ﬁtted to these (Fig 3).
5 Simulations with the model
A model created coherently with the schema illustrated in section two (Fig. 4),
must have at least one equilibrium to be studied in its dynamic properties.
Two options were available: the ﬁrst one was to run the model with plausible
parameters and discover towards which equilibrium it would ﬁnally converge;
this would be easier but would also bear the limit of not being able to un-
derstand how many stable equilibria exist and the impossibility to discover
possible unstable equilibria; the second option was to decide a ’point’ and
’calibrate’ the dynamic system so that this point represent an equilibrium.
All those which will hereafter be called ’points’, for the sake of simplicity, are


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4: Diagrammatic representation of the model.
(Some variables appear more than once because their symbol is replicated elsewhere
to shorten the arrows and improve readability.)
20variables of the model. Among all the possibilities, for concrete advantages
which will be evident below, the point chosen to represent the calibration
equilibrium was the one with all stocks with the standardized value of 1, ex-
cept the skilled and unskilled workers (whose sum is 1), the R&D personnel
(which has the plausible value of 0.02, i.e. around 2% of the population),
and local and world technologies (whose ratio is relevant instead of absolute
values). To make of this ’central point’ an equilibrium, all inﬂows and out-
ﬂows have been multiplied by appropriate constants so that each stock would
persist at the same level of 1 in absence of shocks (again with the exception
of technologies, which would grow forever at the same pace, without altering
the gap).
The ﬁrst advantage of this procedure consists in the fact that one could
easily and immediately confront any value of the system with the benchmark
of 1. The second advantage is that, given the multiplicative form of most
equations, a modiﬁcation of the exponents (which represent the elasticities)
does not move the calibration equilibrium but only aﬀect the dynamics1.
The issue of stability of this equilibrium has to be discussed in the light
of the assumptions on returns of section 4.
Any single equation of the model has decreasing returns (i.e. the sum
of all the exponents is less than 1) by assumption; this because we don’t
believe that a single mechanism can be at the basis of competitiveness and,
therefore, that all the advantages gained in just one aspect fade out during
the development process. At the same time, if the coeﬃcients of the single
equations, even if remaining below 1 in any single equation lie above a certain
level, the interaction between the various equations generates a dynamic
equation with increasing returns. On the contrary, if the coeﬃcients are
lower, the dynamic equation has decreasing returns. Unfortunately, due to
the complexity of the model, it is not possible to explicit the reduced form
of the reduced form equation, however, its dynamics can be studied with a
simulative procedure. We will call the ﬁrst case ”dynamic increasing returns
to scale”, as in Boyer (1988b), since there is a mechanism in which the
positive growth of a variable induces positive growth on the others.
If the dynamic returns are decreasing, the model has just 1 equilibrium,
the central point in which it is calibrated. If the dynamic returns are in-
creasing, the calibration standardized equilibrium is unstable and an upper
and one lover equilibria exist. From a theoretical point of view, the ﬁrst case
is uninteresting for two reasons: ﬁrst because the model would in be unable
1In addition to this, it has to be remarked that, since all variables are standardized, a
multiplication of the inﬂows and outﬂows of a stock by the same value only changes the
speed of adjustment.
21to represent the multiplicity of development levels which is observed in re-
ality and, second, because the heterodox theories evidence that the virtuous
interaction of all the mechanisms in a territory can give rise to trajectories
which make sustainable in time the advantage on competitors. For these two
reasons, the second case have been chosen for the model.
Then it can be added that the two stable equilibria are far enough to
allow a large number of policy simulations in the interval between them. For
this reason, a small shock can make the system in the central unstable equi-
librium start its slow path towards the upper or lower equilibrium, but the
most interesting feature is that structural changes, as appropriate structural
policies, can more eﬀectively put the system on the right growth path and
also move higher and lower equilibria.
The change of the obsolescence parameters (section 4), when combined
to the corresponding change in the inﬂows, is also able to change the speed
of adjustment without changing the central unstable equilibrium.
The simulations conﬁrm that, when an economy is in a stable growth path
or in a declining path (both considered as relative concepts), a shock can not
usually change its long run trajectory and its ﬁnal equilibrium status (Fig.5),
but structural policies (as a better balancing of government spending or a
more intensive investment by the ﬁrms) can change the path. A permanent
shock, aﬀecting for example the demand, can more often than a temporary
one change the trajectory of the system from positive to negative, but its
magnitude has to be considerable. The introduction of cycles, on the other
hand, does not aﬀect the long run path of the system. (Fig.6).
When the model is simulated stochastically, with uncertainty in the growth
of technology (but with the stochastic parameters depending on the values of
the relevant features of the local economy, Fig.7), the growth paths generated
by the model are very diﬀerentiated; this is a feature that we usually ﬁnd
in real economies, in which it is not always clear if the system is perform-
ing some way because of the internal processes of because of the external
occurrences, since the external situation can hide the internal capabilities.
The model can be used to simulate the eﬀect of a large number of possible
development policies, whose eﬀects can be much more easily observed when
the simulation is run non stochastically, in fact, as already mentioned, it
is not easy to disentangle the eﬀect of the shock and that of the policy.
The following policy experiments, therefore, can be viewed as the results
expected on average by a policy maker, before knowing the actual values of
the stochastic factors.
A ﬁrst experiment concerns the installation of a large industrial plant,
built with national resources. This is an expensive and top down policy; in
fact the model shows that in the short run there is a crowding out eﬀect on
22 
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Figure 5: The eﬀect of a temporary shock on four stock variables of a growing
(top) and a declining (bottom) economy: infrastructure (1); research and
university (2); services (3); instruction (4); technology gap (5).
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Figure 6: The eﬀect of the cycle on four stock variables of a growing (top) and
a declining (bottom) economy: infrastructure (1); research and university (2);
services (3); instruction (4); technology gap (5).
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Figure 7: Four diﬀerent development patterns of economies submitted to
random shocks, as synthesized by their ﬁnal indicators (1 to 4).








Figure 8: Eﬀect of the introduction of an exhogenously ﬁnanced large plant
(2) with respect to the benchmark path (1).
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Figure 9: Eﬀect of the introduction of an exogenously ﬁnanced large plant
on four stock variables of an economy: environment (1); ﬁnal indicator (2);
reproducibility (3); value added per capita (4).
local ﬁrms, even if the total long run eﬀect is positive, as already noticed in
Fig.8.
Another possible top-down policy experiment is an increase in infrastruc-
ture exogenously ﬁnanced. This increase has positive eﬀects, but the short
run eﬀects are larger than than the long run ones when the local government
has to maintain the new built infrastructure using only local taxes. In fact
the model and the reference theories assume static decreasing returns to scale
and it is reasonable that doubling infrastructure can not by itself double the
tax revenues (Fig.9).
The eﬀect of state aid on the regional economy can also be simulated:
for instance a general increase of resources for the local government (e.g.
through state aid); this can be the start of a positive growth path, but need
to be considerable and last for some time to be really eﬀective (Fig.10).
The model also allows to simulate the eﬀect of the changes of the ex-
ogenous parameters; for example an increase in the eﬃciency of the use of
public funds (through adequacy, for example), brings important positive ef-
fects (Fig.11). The model does not say how such an increase can be obtained,
but, if the central government, or some supra-national body as the EU com-
mission, achieve to improve the abilities of the local governments, the results
can be important and lasting.
Coming to bottom-up policies, another way in which the local government
becomes more eﬀective, is by better allocating its funds among the diﬀerent
axes; this is allowed and simulated in the model with a modiﬁcation of the
26 
























0.83  1 
1 
1  1 
2 
2 
2  2 
3 
3 
3  3 
4 
4 
4  4 
 
Figure 10: Eﬀect on a stagnating regional economy of the gift of an amount of
exogenous ﬁnancial resources without reimbursement. The four stock vari-
ables represented are: environment (1); ﬁnal indicator (2); reproducibility
(3); value added per capita (4).
 








































Figure 11: Eﬀect of a permanent improvement in government eﬃciency
(through the variable ”adequacy”) on four stock variables of a declining econ-
omy: environment (1); ﬁnal indicator (2); reproducibility (3); value added
per capita (4). The declining pattern can even be reversed.
27 









2  2  2 
3 






Figure 12: Four diﬀerent patterns (represented with the variable ”ﬁnal indica-
tor”) of economies which change their public policy expenditure distribution.
The patterns can be very diﬀerent.
policy mix through the change of the expenditure quotas (Fig.12). The eﬀect
can obviously be positive or negative, depending on if the new mix is better
balanced for the present situation or not.
A modiﬁcation of the tax rate can also be introduced in the model: in gen-
eral this has short run negative eﬀects on the welfare of the population (since
the value added which goes into consumption is part of the ﬁnal indicator)
but, if well spent, can lead to higher growth in the long run.
To complete the list of development policies which are illustrated, the
implementation of local government borrowing, which has positive eﬀects if
done in a period in which the returns of public investment are superior to the
interest rate (which is exogenous to a local production space) (ﬁg.13) and the
implementation of anti-cyclical policies through public deﬁcits in recessions
and surpluses in expansion (Fig.14).
The model also allows to simulate the eﬀects of variations in the behaviour
of the actors of the system: for example, if the ﬁrm decide to re-invest a larger
quota of their proﬁts, this diminishes the income of citizens (the shareholders)
in the short run, but usually pays oﬀ in the longer run, especially if the local
production system is not yet in a deﬁnite equilibrium position with respect
to the others (Fig.15).
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Figure 13: Four diﬀerent patterns (represented with the variable ”ﬁnal in-
dicator”) of economies in which the government borrows to invest. The
diﬀerent patterns of this ﬁgure depend on the interest rate, but the timing
and the structure of expenditure are also important.
 











  Figure 14: With the implementation of anti-cyclical policies and perfect fore-
sight, the development pattern of a region can become less exposed to the
cycles (2 vs 1).
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Figure 15: Five diﬀerent patterns (represented with the variable ”ﬁnal indi-
cator”) of economies in which the ﬁrms decide to reinvest an additional quota
of income, instead of distributing it to the shareholders (the inhabitants of
the region).
6 Economic disparities
The issue of why and when economic activity concentrates in space is dif-
fused across disciplines: in particular it is at the centre of regional economics
and regional science, but mainstream economics and business science are,
especially after the 1980’s (Storper, 1995) experiencing a renewed interest
for the question.
The most diﬀused theoretical reason for the concentration of economic
activity lies in some sort of increasing returns to scale. These can be internal
to the ﬁrm (and they will bend to sectorial concentration), internal to the
sector (the localization economies) or external to the sector but belonging
to some local economic space (Hoover, 1937). The latter case is known as
urbanization economies, which arise for example because of the possibility
for ﬁrms which cluster to take advantage of specialized services, of infras-
tructure which has a minimum scale for provision, of a skilled workforce in
the labour market or of strict interaction with other ﬁrms that makes them
more eﬃcient.
In the real world, however, comparative advantage still plays an impor-
tant role, since ”geographic concentration by itself does not imply the exis-
tence of spillovers” (Ellison and Glaeser, 1997, p.891). But in a theoretical
contribution like this one, the explanation of diﬀerent levels of development
30through natural comparative advantage is not appealing. In fact, if we give
importance to the natural advantage of places, the model loses its generality
and explicative power.
For this reason, the most interesting aspect of the new economic geog-
raphy models is that they allow regions initially equally endowed to ﬁnally
show agglomeration and/or diﬀerent levels of welfare. This usually happens
through cumulative eﬀects caused by the fact that the ﬁrms (through the
labour market, the variety of inputs, their interactions or other mechanisms)
beneﬁt of the presence of other ﬁrms and, through the mobility of some
factors towards the richest region, the agglomeration is reinforced.
Since, probably, the most important point of advantage for the regions
of advanced economies remains the presence of the relevant knowledge and
the capability to renew it in time through the process of innovation (Ratti
et al. 1997), it is more interesting to see if diﬀerent levels of income can take
place without assuming diﬀerent local production systems and without any
movement of people or capital.
If, in fact, we assume that knowledge bears some of the characteristics
of a local public good (Grossman and Helpman, 1991), then technological
competition between local spaces of production can give as outcome the at-
tainment of diﬀerent levels of economic development, and this despite of the
fact that the internal functioning of these can also be the same. The cumu-
lativeness of innovative activity, in addition to the increasing returns to scale
engendered by the interaction of the various mechanisms of a local system,
can in fact give a region a technological advantage that its competitors are
not able to catch up. This despite the spontaneous diﬀusion of knowledge
and the imitation processes, which may not be able to ﬁll the gap.
The model of this article is structurally designed to be able to simply
produce and simulate such a behaviour: all is needed is to place a number
of identical models the one besides the other and then to link them through
technology.
In fact, since all the factors are by assumption regional-speciﬁc and, as in
occidental Europe, the workers are not mobile, the interaction between the
various models (that is between the various production systems) will occur
through technology. To accomplish this, the world level of technology is
endogenized and becomes composed of all the technical knowledge available
in all the production spaces of the model.
We assume, as we also did in section 1, that any knowledge present in a
place will be part of the world knowledge, but at the same time, we allow
the possibility to have some pieces of knowledge shared by two or more
regions. If there exist n regions, we represent with n sets the technologies






Figure 16: Three regional sets of technology with lower and higher overlap-
ping of technologies.
stated above, we deﬁne the world technology WT as the union of the n
local sets of technology LTi; at the same time we also make the simplifying
assumptions that ﬁrst no intersection of two or more sets is empty and,
second, that no set is included in the union of all the others. With these
hypotheses it is possible to represent WT as in Fig. 16 depending on the
high/low degree of subsitutability/compementarity.
The world technology is in both cases the union of the sets, no intersection
is empty and the technology gap of, for example, region A, is given by:
Sn
i LTi ¡ LTA Sn
i LTi
.
A simple c.e.s. type function allows to calculate the world level of tech-









Where WT is the word technology and LTi are the local ones. The pa-
rameter ± depends on the degree of overlapping between the regional knowl-
edge bases; this is for simplicity supposed equal among the regions and has
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Figure 17: A four regional model obtained linking 4 identical regional sys-
tems.
to be higher than 1 to respect the hypotheses. A higher ± corresponds to
economies in which the technological bases are more similar and, therefore,
the blueprints possessed in one region are more rarely diﬀerent from those
possessed by the other region; the opposite is true for a lower ± (Fig.16). The
existence of multiple equilibria also depends on the size of ±: the higher, the
more divergent the model. It is not necessary to have the same degree of com-
plementarity of knowledge for all regions (in the real world this parameter is
likely to be higher for regions which are more similar and/or closer) but this
realism, if implemented, would add complexity to the model without qual-
itatively changing the results and therefore without aﬀecting its explicative
power.
Stochastic simulations (i.e. with innovation being a random outcome
dependent on the eﬀort devoted to it) produce patterns which are diﬀerent
one replication from the other and highly realistic, but which also are diﬃcult
to interpret. For this reasons the mathematical properties of the model have
been analyzed using the deterministic form.
For the sake of simplicity, the parameters of all the regional economies












Figure 18: A bi-regional system reaches a stable income diﬀerentiation situ-
ation in the long run.
have been set so as to have, at the beginning of the simulations, all the re-
gions in the same calibration unstable equilibrium where all stocks are equal
to one (the same used with just one region); the short run elasticities were
also kept equal among regions because we thought it was more interesting
to confront diﬀerent dynamic patterns of regions which are not diﬀerent in
their essence, even if these elasticities could be changed without moving the
central unstable equilibrium. In fact, if diﬀerent regions are simulated with
diﬀerent elasticities, it is like trying to explain the diﬀerent performances
by the mean of comparative advantage, an investigation which is more in-
teresting in applied empirical research than in a theoretical model like this
one.
The stable equilibria of the multi-regional models were searched by simu-
lation: if the dynamic returns to scale of the single regions are increasing as
assumed in section 5, starting with all the regions in the same unstable equi-
librium, asymmetric (for example diﬀerent in term of magnitude or timing)
shocks put the regions on their way to stable equilibria which are reached in
long run simulations (Fig.18).
With a world composed of more than one competing territory (four of
them in Fig.17), there is the possibility of outcomes with diﬀerent territories
having diﬀerent performances so that some stabilize themselves near the
technological frontier (i.e. their technology is not far from encompassing











Figure 19: Exogenous random shocks on two regional economies are not
generally able to change the rankings of the regions in term of the ﬁnal
indicator.
all the world technology), and other in lagging positions; we observe in fact
multiple equilibria, a feature which is common to most of the spatial economy
literature of the ’90s.
This adds to previous literature that multiple equilibria can be obtained
in a diﬀerent manner: in fact the model uses the traditional c.e.s. function,
but, instead of implementing a model coherent with mainstream economics,
generates endogenous economic disparities having at the very basis a model
of economy consistent with the heterodox theories of the new regional science
and innovation. It is also important to observe that agglomeration is obtained
without any mobility of factors with the exception of knowledge, on the
contrary, mobility is essential to generate agglomeration in a bunch of models
in the wave of Krugman (1991).
To summarize the steps followed to obtain this outcome, (1) we have rep-
resented the regional economy coherently with heterodox economic theories;
(2) we have assumed short term decreasing returns and dynamic long term
increasing returns inside every region, with all regions being identical; (3)
the regions are put in competition the one with the others on technology and
no factor mobility is allowed; (4) because knowledge is cumulative and helps
maintain an environment propitious to innovation, it is possible to observe
multiple equilibria.
If the model is simulated stochastically, its mathematical properties obvi-
35ously become less visually evident, depending on the degree of randomness.
Stochastic simulations make the model able to replicate the patterns of rel-
ative growth of the regions and in particular the observed persistence of
regions in their welfare ranking (Fig.19).
The policy experiments of section three can be attempted also in this
extended settings, and their results, for the single region in which they are
implemented, don’t have diﬀerent results. The same conclusions hold true
and are reinforced: with structural policies it is easier to change the path
of the regional economies than with simple injections of money. Moreover
structural policies, to be really eﬀective, should target the mechanisms the
regions use to create/imitate/use innovation.
7 Advantages and limits of the approach
Before drawing the conclusions, it is useful to assess advantages and limits
of the approach, as well as the main achievements.
The use of the System Dynamics allows to build a representation of the
mechanics of a local production system keeping into account both the com-
plexity and the feed-backs, two things which are diﬃcult to represent with
the standard analytical instruments of economics. This diﬃculty often leads,
on the one side, mainstream economists to opt for models much simpler than
reality, and, on the other side, regional scientists and geographers to opt for
descriptive models.
The approach of this contribution is instead intermediate and can rep-
resent a satisfactory compromise between the two above: it is able to deal
well with both a large number of variables and interaction and allows to see
the mechanisms while at work during the simulations; the model is also able
to reproduce a large number of policy initiatives, which can in this way be
understood more deeply.
The ample capability of replicating diﬀerent policies and behaviours is in
fact one of the most interesting features, and this compensates the fact that,
diﬀerently from most economic models, not all the behaviours are optimizing
(it is also debated if real behaviours are optimizing indeed, but this issue
would go beyond economics and regional science to cognitive psychology).
The ﬁrst limit is that this model is based on standardized values for the
variables which are often (apart from the population quotas) not directly
linkable to real world values; nevertheless, this feature is common to most
theoretical economic models, and, moreover, since the focus here is on the
mechanics inside a local system of production and innovation, it is important
to see how the variables interact the one with the other more than how big,
36in absolute terms, are their values.
The second limit of this model is that it is not able to explain long run
growth, since it has, when simulated with just one region, two stable equi-
libria, one upper and one lower, even if far apart; these roughly correspond
to technological forerunners regions and to lagging ones. When the model is
simulated with two or more regions, it still has multiple equilibria. We believe
that the lack of endogenous long run growth is not enough to harm the signif-
icance of the results obtained, ﬁrst because the stated purpose was to explain
relative growth instead than absolute, and, second, since the model has to be
applied to the regions of the advanced industrial world, relative disparities
among these remain a very important policy issue indeed, especially because
of their implications for social cohesion (EU Commission, 2003). To make an
example, no European lagging region is poor in ”absolute” (World) terms,
nor is its population; however the gap with the most advanced ones is the
reason of large eﬀorts from national states and the EU to try to achieve con-
vergence (Rodriguez-Pose and Fratesi, 2004). This despite, or even because,
Objective 1 regions now appear to grow on average (Canova and Boldrin,
2001) at about the same pace of the rest of the Union.
8 Conclusions
This article justiﬁes four main conclusions, two theoretical and two of policy.
From a theoretical point of view, the possibility to build a diagrammatic
and equational representation of a territorial system of production and in-
novation, coherent with almost all the theories that in the introduction have
been classiﬁed as heterodox, is a strong signal of the possibility to further
integrate them: throughout the model, they appear more compatible than
substitute, and the diﬀerent focuses of one theory on one aspect, and of an-
other theory on another aspect do not make them conﬂict. When a method-
ology is able to give space to more than one aspect at the same time (as the
system dynamics is), all the aspects appear to integrate very well indeed.
The other theoretical conclusion is that diﬀerent levels of development
among regions can have pure technological causes. In this model’s most
interesting outcome, regions show diﬀerent levels of production and also
diﬀerent prices for their productions depending on the level of technology
embodied in them. For this reason the source of under-development or of
scarce economic activity is shown to reside either in the inability of a ter-
ritory to produce/imitate technology because of the malfunctioning of the
internal socio-economic structure, or in the impossibility for the lagging re-
gion to catch up with the forerunners because of the cumulative nature of
37knowledge. We have in fact shown that when the creation of new knowledge
is highly dependent on previously accumulated knowledge or when knowl-
edge is very sticky, it may be not suﬃcient for the follower to have the same
internal structure of the forerunner to catch up with it.
The ﬁrst policy conclusion is that no economic policy it the ”best” in an
absolute sense. Various indicators of income and welfare have in fact to be
taken into account as well as the time horizon of the decisor; all these will
have to be combined according to a speciﬁc utility function so that the policy
advisor will never be able to propose standard recipes.
The second policy conclusion is that, since more and more the competi-
tion between areas of the advanced world is on knowledge and technology,
and since these are sticky and cumulative factors, radically embedded in
the people living the territories, regional policies aiming at lagging regions,
should not forget to target:
(a) The internal functioning of the production system of the under-developed
regions, in order to make it produce knowledge more ﬂuidly; these policies
may target the presence of human capital, both in increasing the informal
qualiﬁcations of the workers (the ’skills’) and the formal level of instruction
and also with the creation of a living and working environment able to rep-
resent a viable option for the more skilled workers (the only really mobile)
when choosing where to live; the policies should also target the ﬁrms of the
territory in their aptitude towards innovation and imitation, since every new
investment, if the ﬁrm is not able to keep the pace of external innovation, is
not by itself able to create long lasting development and may soon become
obsolete; the policies should also target the public bodies, since they should
be able to create an environment where innovation processes may happen:
in this model the right ’mix’ of public expenditure and the overall eﬃciency
in the expenditure of funds are fundamental variables; concerning the role
of infrastructure, if it has to be an eﬀective mean of growth creation, it has
to be well integrated in the knowledge creation process and, if exogenously
added in quantity beyond the needs of the economy, it is not able by itself
to create the economic activity which will use it.
(b) The inter-regional circulation of knowledge, so that the lagging regions
could more easily acquire the technology through diﬀusion and imitation from
the advanced ones; as we pointed out, this process is sticky and not easy to
artiﬁcially produce because of tacit knowledge: the model’s learning sector
very well takes this into account.
All the available policy instruments (R&D support, education, training,
business assistance, hard and soft infrastructure investment, etc.) have there-
fore to be mixed at their best (without forgetting to take into account the
timing of policies), in order to create a system able to compete in the knowl-
38edge economy.
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43Appendix A: Starting equations of the model
INDICATOR AND CONTROL
FINAL_INDICATOR = Riproducibility ^0.4 * (34/27 *  Value_Added_Per_Capita ) ^0.4 * 
Profitability_Core = Profits_Core[Utili_Netti]/(Quantities_Core*Prices_Core)/CORE
Profitability_Ring = Profits_Ring[Utili_Netti]/(Prices_Ring*Quantities_Ring)/RING
Riproducibility = ENVIRONMENT^0.05 * (INFRASTRUCTURE * 0.5 )^0.11 * INSTRUCTION^0.11 * 
(10/3 * Skilled_ratio ) ^0.11 * RESEARCH_AND_UNIVERSITY^0.15 * (50 * R&D_personnel_ratio) 
^0.2 * SERVICES^0.11 * (10/3 * Technology_gap) ^0.16 Value_Added_Per_Capita = Value_Added[netto] / (Population + R_&_D_Personnel)
Var_Riproducibility = TREND(Riproducibility,1)
INNOVATION
LOCAL_TECHNOLOGY(t) = LOCAL_TECHNOLOGY(t - dt) + (Diffusion + Imitation + 
Local_Innovation) * dt
INIT LOCAL_TECHNOLOGY = 0.7 INFLOWS:
Diffusion = (WORLD_TECHNOLOGY- LOCAL_TECHNOLOGY) * Openness * 
Imitation = (WORLD_TECHNOLOGY-LOCAL_TECHNOLOGY) 
Local_Innovation = LOCAL_TECHNOLOGY * 0.03 * (EXPRND( 
RESEARCH_AND_UNIVERSITY )+EXPRND( RESEARCH_AND_UNIVERSITY )+EXPRND( 
RESEARCH_AND_UNIVERSITY )+EXPRND( RESEARCH_AND_UNIVERSITY )+EXPRND( 
RESEARCH_AND_UNIVERSITY )+EXPRND( RESEARCH_AND_UNIVERSITY )+EXPRND(  RESEARCH_AND_UNIVERSITY(t) = RESEARCH_AND_UNIVERSITY(t - dt) + (Inve_R_&_D - 
Obs_R_&_D) * dt
INIT RESEARCH_AND_UNIVERSITY = 1 INFLOWS:
Inve_R_&_D = ( ( Adequacy * Expenditure[Pol_R&D] + Profits_Core[Inve_Innovazione])/ 29.4 
OUTFLOWS:
Obs_R_&_D = RESEARCH_AND_UNIVERSITY * 0.2
WORLD_TECHNOLOGY(t) = WORLD_TECHNOLOGY(t - dt) + (Technical_Progress) * dt
INIT WORLD_TECHNOLOGY = 1
INFLOWS:
Technical_Progress =  WORLD_TECHNOLOGY * 
((EXPRND(0.07)+EXPRND(0.07)+EXPRND(0.07)+EXPRND(0.07)+EXPRND(0.07)+EXPRND
(0.07)+EXPRND(0.07)+EXPRND(0.07)+EXPRND(0.07)+EXPRND(0.07)+EXPRND(0.07)+EX




LEARNING AND HUMAN RESSOURCES
INSTRUCTION(t) = INSTRUCTION(t - dt) + (Inv_Instruction - Obs_Instruction) * dt
INIT INSTRUCTION = 1
INFLOWS:
Inv_Instruction =  (Expenditure[Pol_Istruzione]/18) ^0.5 *2
OUTFLOWS:
Obs_Instruction = INSTRUCTION*0.2
R_&_D_Personnel(t) = R_&_D_Personnel(t - dt) + (High_Instruction - Retirements_R&D_personnel) * 
dt
INIT R_&_D_Personnel = 0.02 INFLOWS:




44SKILLED(t) = SKILLED(t - dt) + (Formation + Obsolescence_and_Training - Retirement_Skilled) * dt
INIT SKILLED = .3
INFLOWS:
Formation = Population * 0.03 * ( (exp(1)^(-LOGN(7)+LOGN(3)*INSTRUCTION)) / 
Obsolescence_and_Training =  - SKILLED*0.07 + 0.015 * USKILLED * INSTRUCTION^0.5 + 
OUTFLOWS:
Retirement_Skilled = SKILLED*0.03
USKILLED(t) = USKILLED(t - dt) + (Births - retirement_Unskilled - Obsolescence_and_Training) * dt
INIT USKILLED = .7
INFLOWS:
Births = Population * Population * 0.03 * (1- ( (exp(1)^(-LOGN(7)+LOGN(3)*INSTRUCTION)) / 
OUTFLOWS:
retirement_Unskilled = USKILLED*0.03
Obsolescence_and_Training =  - SKILLED*0.07 + 0.015 * USKILLED * INSTRUCTION^0.5 + 
Population = 1
R&D_personnel_ratio = R_&_D_Personnel/Population
Skilled_ratio = SKILLED / Population
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Builiding_Infrastructure(t) = Builiding_Infrastructure(t - dt) + (Inv_Infrastructure - Building) * dt
INIT Builiding_Infrastructure = 0.8
 TRANSIT TIME = 2
 INFLOW LIMIT = INF
 CAPACITY = INF
INFLOWS:
Inv_Infrastructure = (Expenditure[Pol_Infrastrutture] * Adequacy / 0.144 )^0.5 * 0.4
OUTFLOWS:
Building = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW
ENVIRONMENT(t) = ENVIRONMENT(t - dt) + (Decontamination + Biopersistence - Pollution) * dt
INIT ENVIRONMENT = 1
INFLOWS:
Decontamination = 0.065 * (Expenditure[Pol_Ambiente] / 0.18 ) ^0.5
Biopersistence = 0.05*(1-ENVIRONMENT)
OUTFLOWS:
Pollution = ( 0.02*Value_Added[lordo]+0.02*Population ) * ENVIRONMENT
INFRASTRUCTURE(t) = INFRASTRUCTURE(t - dt) + (Building - Obsol_Infrastructure) * dt
INIT INFRASTRUCTURE = 2
INFLOWS:
Building = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW
OUTFLOWS:
Obsol_Infrastructure = INFRASTRUCTURE * 0.2
RESSOURCES_LOCAL_GVT(t) = RESSOURCES_LOCAL_GVT(t - dt) + (Inflows + Interests - 
Outflows) * dt
INIT RESSOURCES_LOCAL_GVT = .9 INFLOWS:
Inflows = Value_Added[lordo] * Tax_% + Extra_Resources_from_National_GVT
Interests = (RESSOURCES_LOCAL_GVT - Outflows) * Interest_rate
OUTFLOWS:
Outflows = ARRAYSUM(Expenditure[*])
45SERVICES(t) = SERVICES(t - dt) + (Investment_Services - Obsolescence_Services) * dt
INIT SERVICES = 1
INFLOWS:
Investment_Services = Adequacy*(Expenditure[Pol_Servizi]/18 )^0.5 * 10/4
OUTFLOWS:
Obsolescence_Services = 0.2*SERVICES




Expenditure[Pol_Ambiente] = RESSOURCES_LOCAL_GVT * 0.2 + step(0.0,3)
Expenditure[Pol_Infrastrutture] = RESSOURCES_LOCAL_GVT * 0.2 +step(0.0,3)
Expenditure[Pol_R&D] = RESSOURCES_LOCAL_GVT * 0.2 +step(0.0,3) + pulse(0.0,2,1000)
Expenditure[Pol_Istruzione] = RESSOURCES_LOCAL_GVT * 0.2 +step(0.0,3)
Expenditure[Pol_Servizi] = RESSOURCES_LOCAL_GVT *0.2 +step(0.00,3)
Extra_Resources_from_National_GVT = 0 * ( ( IF(  Var_Value_Added<0) then 0.3 * 







CORE(t) = CORE(t - dt) + (Mobility_Core) * dt
INIT CORE = 1
INFLOWS:
Mobility_Core = On_Off* (  0.2 * (step(1,2)*(Core_profits_per_firm - delay 
(Core_profits_per_firm,1))) + 0.1 * (RING /CORE -1 ) +  0.02* (0.1 - abs(Openness-0.7) )  
+0.02* (Riproducibility/ Firms^2 - 0.25 ) + 0.002 * (ENVIRONMENT-1) ) RING(t) = RING(t - dt) + (Mobility_Ring) * dt
INIT RING = 1
INFLOWS:
Mobility_Ring = On_Off* (  0.2 * (step(1,2)*(Ring_profits_per_firm - delay 
Core_profits_per_firm = Profits_Core[Utili_Netti]/CORE
Costs_Core = (10/3 *  Skilled_ratio )^-0.3 * (50 *  R&D_personnel_ratio ) ^-0.2 * RING ^-0.2 * 
Costs_Ring =  ( 10/3 * Skilled_ratio)^ -0.3 * Infrastructure_Per_Firm ^-0.3 *  (10/3*Technology_gap) 
MARKET_CYCLES = 0 * SINWAVE(1,10)
Markup = 1 - Tax_%
On_Off = 1
Openness = .6
Prices_Core = Costs_Core * Total_markup
Prices_Ring = Costs_Ring * Total_markup
Profits_Core[Utili_Netti] = (Prices_Core-Costs_Core) * Quantities_Core * CORE * (1-Tax_%) * 
Profits_Core[Totali_dopo_le_tasse] = (Prices_Core-Costs_Core) * Quantities_Core * CORE * 
Profits_Core[Inve_Innovazione] = (Prices_Core-Costs_Core) * Quantities_Core * CORE * (1-Tax_%) 
Profits_Core[Inve_Risorse_Umane] = (Prices_Core-Costs_Core) * Quantities_Core * CORE * 
Profits_Core[Lordi_pre_tasse] = (Prices_Core-Costs_Core) * Quantities_Core * CORE + 0* 
Profits_Ring[Utili_Netti] = (Prices_Ring-Costs_Ring) * Quantities_Ring * RING * (1-Tax_%) * 
Profits_Ring[Totali_dopo_le_tasse] = (Prices_Ring-Costs_Ring) * Quantities_Ring * RING * 
46Profits_Ring[Inve_Innovazione] = (Prices_Ring-Costs_Ring) * Quantities_Ring * RING * (1-Tax_%) * 
Profits_Ring[Inve_Risorse_Umane] = (Prices_Ring-Costs_Ring) * Quantities_Ring * RING * 
Profits_Ring[Lordi_pre_tasse] = (Prices_Ring-Costs_Ring) * Quantities_Ring * RING +0* (1-Tax_%) * 
Quantities_Core = (6.4 + 1 * SERVICES  - CORE  - 4 *Technology_gap  + MARKET_CYCLES - 2* 
Quantities_Ring = (3.9 + 1 * SERVICES  - RING - 3 *Technology_gap +MARKET_CYCLES  +CORE) 
Quotas[Tipi_Quote] = .2
Ring_profits_per_firm = Profits_Ring[Utili_Netti]/RING
Total_markup = 1+  Markup / (1-Tax_%)
Value_Added[netto] = Profits_Ring[Utili_Netti] + Profits_Core[Utili_Netti]
Value_Added[lordo] = Profits_Ring[Lordi_pre_tasse] + Profits_Core[Lordi_pre_tasse]
Var_Prof_Core = TREND(Profits_Core[Utili_Netti],1)
Var_Prof_Ring = TREND(Profits_Ring[Utili_Netti],1)
Not in a sector
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